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The financial structureof representativegroups of small businessess described in the precedingChapter, indus- try by industi,'.From the experienceof these companies over the period1926-36 the presentchapter will craw certain implicatjothat have significancefor the gen-
era]. prcbl.ma of financingsmall enterprise.. Theseeleven year.SflCsS3$period of cyclicalexpansion (1926-29), $ period ofcyclical contraction(1930-32) and another
period of cyclical expansion(1933-36). j/ Th. following
pages d.al oii1with particular samplesof small enter-
prise. that continued inezietenee throughout theseyears, but there is noreason to believ, that the finding,would
iot sppIy in large asure to U enterpriass ingen-
era]., and to both successfuland unsuccessfulones.
LOIG-TEB DEBT
An important characteristic ofthe financial struc-
ture ofaflmanufacturing companies,as revealed by our
sample., is their asmwtt of long-term debt.This
mas apparentfrogth.case studies in Chapter 2,but it
is sufficient]7importantto werrantelaboration here.
For each industrial sample,considered as a group, long-
term debtasoujt.4 tothefollowing proportions oftotal
assets, at the beginaing and end of the psriodetudied.f
These figure., however,pertain to the aggregate of all




Msn'. clothIng 1.2 2.5
Pug1tw'. 1.2 4.4
Ston.-cl.y 3.4
Iddns tool 4.Ie 7.2Faancing Sisal! Corporatj0
reported no long-termdebt tasr:
clothing 8?p.rcert, end in the other industries fr,
74 scent,of the COmPanies rePOrted no lOflg..tsium
debt in 1936,and in 1926theseproportions wu
higher.
For thecorporat tons that did hay,such debt the
figures given in thetabulationabove of a
considerable understatiment.In considering the..cos-.
panics,long-tI'U debt cannot be directly co)uted j
relation to total asset.but itcan be cc ted in rs..
lation tonet land and plant.On th. latter base the
proportions for thereportingcompanies in the various
industries were as foflowat the beginning and end of
th. period:/
1926
30% (251 of .11 Co..)361 (311 or11 Co..)
oo'a cloUd.nj 46(11"" 'I) 53(13 )
1um1trs 30( 9 )j(fl U )
Stom.-clsy 23(21" ") 35(30"" )
5.chstn. tool 34(14.
H 1 ) 51(26' N a)
We know the ratio of the net land and plant of a
the co,anjes in thesample. totheir total assets
and from thi.ratioit is possible to comPute, tr the
companie. that reported long-term debt, rough e.-itea
of what suchdebt aenui*d toin relation to total as-
sets. The resulting proportions are shown herewith. Thea.
k1n1 191 221
SSfl'$ Clothl;.g 4 5
Purnjt,ar. 5 11
Stons-c1a7 12 15
Nachins tool 15 20
estimates, crude as they are,indicat, thatfor particu-
lar cmpnies in these sample, ofamall nufacturing cor-
poration. long-term debtconstituted an important source
of financing, a source, too,that seems to have increased
in importance over the1926-36 period. This finding ii
corroborated by data on the netau.'t of fundsderived
from such debt, and thenet aunt expendedon reducing
it during three periodsof the decade 1927-3ó;/ a tab'i-
lation of these data ispresented on the following page,
with minus signsused to indicate thenet reductions of
long-term debt.It appears that in the1927-29 period long-term debt
constituted a fairly sisablesource of funds for th. fur-
niture arid mechtn. tool aseples. ut despite such indi-
cations thatlong-term debt was ofsome iortance for
c.rt.ain of thee. sashcorporations and in certain years,
the fact remains that it was not.a significant source of
funds for the coepanjes in theaggregate or over the pe-
riod as a whole.
Mat long-term debt thesecoarti.s had appears to
have been mertgag. debtrather than unsecuredbond and
note issues. Federal income tax returns inthe period cov-
ered by this study called for th. breakdownof long-term
debt into two Categories:unsecured bonds and notes; and
mortgagee and other similarly secured debt.The report-
ing of th.s. itemsmay have been incomplete, especially
since these were casfl companies; biat at leastaccording
to the reports practically allthe long-term debt con-
sisted of mortgages and similarly secured obligations.An
exception is th.chine tool sample; there one-half the
long-tsr. debt was listed as unsecured bonds andnotes.W
It mightbe inferred that the long-term debt of
thse smeltnufacturers, since it appears to have con-
sisted largely of mortgageobligations, wee incirred
asinly for th purpose of acqairing new assets. Probably
moroften, however, it represented a means of providing
creditor relief to a financially embarrassed enterprise,
through thefunding of book or notecredits under a
moztgag.indenture, or a means of makingv'-tpayment,
through the granting of a mortgage clsI*, when ownership
was transferred by sale or inheritance.
Th. infrequency of long-term debt among the compa-
nies studied was du. notonly to the owners' unwilling-
ness to j.opardis. their control but .1.0 to the prospec-
tive lender's fear of loss. An investment in meshenter-
prises hasa large speculative element.The success of
the businessis usually dependentupon the skill of a
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tion is fraught withwicertathty,andtheinstabilit,o
the mirkets for suppliesand sale, makes accurateantic.
ipatioi% almostii.pssible.Therefor, aninvestor j
smiul cospan7 wouldrather hay. anopportunity to ehat,
in any unusualor speculative profits,thanaccept
promise of a fixed but emil r.turn.lf m. failure rat,
is higb.r among 11 than among large enterpri.ea, a
as a rule th. liquidation valu, of an Unsuccessful s..j
coepy is barely adequatetosatisfy the claimsof
short-termcreditors, not to mention those of long..t.ra
creditors. It is certainly true, however, that an
tant reason for the infrequency of long-t.ra debt, among
the type of cospsnie. studied her. lies with the Omisre
themselves.Because the earning power of their buiis.
is unstable, thq would naturally strive to avoid f
charges and the accospanyingdanger oflosing their
property.
Among the five industries studied here, diffic..
in theproportions of long-tern debt can be tracedto
differencesinthe various industries'discontjgwinc,
rates, in the stability of their earning., and intheir
relative inv.stmsnt in fixed asset..In men's clothing
manufacturediscontinuance. were IMeroue andearning.
were farfromstable; because of thesefactors,and also
because such cospanie.have solittle property to
gage, the ratio of fdsd debt to total assetswe
and there mis a large proportion ofcompanies withno
long-term debt,even in comparison withthe other sample,
of msoU manufacturer.. In baking, on theotherband,
earnings msre stable,there mire fewer discontinuance.
than in most of the othergroups,and theinvestment in
land, plait and equipesntwa.relatively heavy;thersfoi', the ratio of long-team debtto total assets miscya-
tively higti and theproportion of ani.s with no tied-
.d debt was slightly lessthan in the otherindustri,s.I/ iat long-term debt s recorded forthethree durable goods industri.,can psrtisps hi traced totheir extensive
mschinjsation.Certainlythe stability oftheir mirnings would not encourageloog-t.,lender,.
Sewul buainea.enterprise,cannot generally relycm the inatituti ised capital marketfor long-term credit, because theirassets andmanagement,arespec lalised, theirsalvag, value iseight, andtheir credit needsSr. not subject tostandaj,appr.j.a In these respectschaqi"fCredát Needs
the large enterpris.is a directContrast and hence its
creditor-debtor rlationshipwith the formal, capital r-
ket ii ieraoria1 and standardiaed.2/In addition, there
j the i.portant, considerationthat the cost of floating
maul issuesOflthS capital markets would be prohibitive,
even for Companies h larger than those inour samples.
The reasons put forward inexplanation of the infre-
quency of lang-t.ra credit in the finaacjalstructure of
compsnj. apply also to thesecompanies' sesU use
of pr.tsrred stockas a means of raising capital.Cnly
inthfurnitur, and machine toolsamples were theta any
appreciable numbers ofcorporationsreporting preferred
sharesin 1936 (21 sod 17percent,respectively), and
among these establishments such shareswere not partic-
ularly important;in the other industriesless than a
tenth of the companies reportedanypreferred shares in
their capitaltructur..iQfIt is probable that most of
the preferred shares issued by thesesmall compsnies were
the result of special circumstances,as in the rare cases
of long-term debt,and did not represent regular issues
designed for the acquisition ofnew assets.
?IXSD PROPItfl(PENDIflJHES
It has already been pointed out that the long-term
debt of thesesmallcorporations, so far as it existed,
was probably not incurred for the purpose of expanc4ing
fixed property.This is suggested by the fact that it
consisted largely ofmortgage obligations, and it is cor-
roborated by an amalysis offixed property expenditures.
But it should be rered that a sm1lamount of long-
term debt does not necessarily mean that land and plant
are notq*ndod, for fixed property outlays are not nec-
easarilyfinanced bylong-term borrowings.They may be
financed by renawed short-term borrowings, by funds from
operations or from the owners, or by asset liquidation.
Thus thesecompanies mighthave expanded and modernized
their op.ratlng facilities bymaking use of some of the
amounts withdrawn as offjce compensation, which, as we
have seen,were ssable in each of the industries through-
out the period studied.
There is a serious difficulty inherent in an attmapt.
to estjtea company' a propertyexpenditures from the fi-C finai,cinq S,r,allCorpoyi*t10,,.
62
nancial stat1tsit submits to theBureau of Iiter,
Revenue, forfinancial stateefltsrarely ShOW such ot
lays a. a separateitme.Expenditure5for maintenance
repair - which in50ufscturing industries are not tec
nical.ly regarded asproperty outlays - are frequent3,
shown separately,as acharge to the profitand los.
count, but those forr.plaCflt3 andextensions of opep.
ating facilitieS arepreaabl7 capitalized. 31/These
fixed propertyexpenditures - outlays for replacement
xpansiol% of land,plant and equipment - sustgenersijr
be derivedby comparing theannual change in fixed prop-
erty with the arsaldepreciationchargeand with an1
asset revaluation'that y havebeen made.Net expan.
sion of fixed property -outlays for expansion alone /
- is arrived atbysubtractingfrom fixed property e.
pendituree the part thatrepresents replacoments, or an
ticipatedcapital consumption.(
Depreciation charge.havebeenregarded asrepre-
sentative of the anticipated capital consumption of thew
companies,/ although there aretwo important reaaoi
the figures Should not be taken too literally.In the
first place, veer and tear of plant and equipment are dif
ficult to estimate, evenwhere an appraisal of theanjua
depreciation ii the an].y purpose. In the second place,
it is m that some of the concerns inthese sisples
valuedtheir property account fromtime totine by meane
of acharge of credit taken directly to surplus.When an
owner thought ha bad failed in prior years to charge off
enough depreciation against plantand equipient, he wrote
down th. account; if he feared (or if the Internal Revs-
sue agent decided) that he had charged offtoo such, he
wrote up the account.Like depreciati3n charges, these
writeups and vritedowns are inthe natureof roughesti-
tes; in addition, the year in which they are entered cc
the books of an enterpriseis not a trustworthyindica-
tion of the tins when an unanticipated depreciation or
appreciation occurred.
Thee. quAlifications should be borneinmind/ in
*xailidngthe figures onthefollowing page, whichper- tain tothe entire period 19Z1-36.th/ Those on proper-
ty expansion or contractionaredei[wed by subtracting
depreciation charge. from fixed propertyexpenditures
adding the positive or negative figureon propertyreval-























These figures iidicate thatinnone of the indus-
tries except stone-clay wathere a significant expansion
or contractionin fixed property over the decade. And
there the sizable contractionin land, plant and equip-
ment probablyrepresented a depletionof raw material
resourcesrather than a failure to maintain operating
plants, exclusive of clay deposi......It. appears,too, that
in these five industries thereva].uatiogis ofplant and
equipc.ient werenal1, especially in comparison with de-
preciation charges.Over the decade as a whole onlytwo
of the industries had, in the aggregate, an important net
writeup or writedowa: the bakeries wrote down their plant
and equipment, largely in the 1930t s; andthe furniture
nanufacturers wrote up this account, mostly inthe late
1920' s.j7jSouie ofthese Nriteupsprobably resulted
froia overdepreciation in the years before 1927, or per-
has fro.the optimism characteristic of 1929, but it is
impossible to pin down revaluations to theprecise year
to which they areproperly applicable without making a
detailedcase study of each coiapany.
Annual estimates of the average net land and plant
ex1enditures per ccmpany are shown in Chart 1.Because
of the iauossibilityof precise allocation writeups and
aritedowns were ignored in the calculationsofthese es-
tiniates, and the depreciation charge alone was taken to
measure the consumption of capita]. during the year.The
figures were reduced to a per company basis in order to
improvetheir industrialcomparability, but theyare
still not fully comparable from oneindustry to another
because the average size of these companies varies in the
dirferent industries. The 66 furniturecompanies, for
exauple, havesomewhat larger average assetsthan the
cuipanjes in the other industries.
Chart 1indicates thatexcemit. in uen' sclothing,
wftere property expenditures are generally unimp..rtant,it
has principally in the years 1930-35that the net prop-
C*"g'nvCredát Needs 6S
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outlays of these companieswere negativ../ In the
other years of the 1927-36 decade th. companies somewhat
,p4sd their plant and epdpasnt.The stone-clay group
tanQa out prominently in thi, chart becauseas early as
1929 it failed tomaintain it.. plant and equipment (in-
cludingcloy deposit.), and sustainedacontraction in
every succeeding year ofthedecade.Thissingular per-
formanca may net be wholly unrelated tothe secular de-
cline of theatone-clay industry,although pro bably a
.e important factor is depletion of the claydeposits.
Thus, on the whole, the available data suggest that
the fixed property senditures of these smallmanufac-
turersover the 1927-36 decade Just about equaled the de-
preciation charged for the same period.In other words,
the companiesspentonland and plant little, if any, sore
than th. funds from operations that were earmarked on the
books of account for replacing worn-out plant and equip-
sent.To be mire, the mere earmarking of such funds does
not make thee availabl, for outlays on land and plant:
they may becom. tied up in current assets or be absorbed
by operating losses.8ut over a period of years, some of
ich were profitable ones, the former contingencywould
not. be important and the latter would beonlytemporary.
Therefore wey conclude,from the present data, that
these email companie. did not significantly expand their
land and plant over the period studied.This means that
thiyhad little need for long-term funds, whether equity
or creditor, and that credit facilities designed to pro-
vide such funds would have been largely unnecessary.
SHORT-TM DEBT
Th. current debt of these small manufacturers seems
to have undergone notable changes over the 1926-36 period,
both in regard to its distribution between accounts pay-
abl, and notes payabl. and in regard to the importance or
these two itecis in comparison with relevant items in cur-
rent assets.
Distribution of Short-Term Debt
For an analysts of the comparative importance of ac
Counts payable and notes payable we may take total assets
se a basis of reckoning.Chart 2 and Table 13 indicate
JS
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that. on tnia basisasrcantjjs credit,increased during 1926-36 while notespayable - whichmay be aesuwed to haveisict.dlargely of bankcredit.12/-increased 1.. rkodLy, rmedstable or actuallydeclined.
LaC5.flbe seen fro, th.chart, every industryrepro- santed here showed anincrease,during 1926-36,in it, proportion of accountspayable,In all of the industries
this incrsas. OCCurredlargely in the last,half of the pe- Hod, during the depressionand early recoveryyea rs./ Tb. contrastinthis respectbetween the beginningand endof the period is clearlyevident. from the figureson aU companies" in Table13, where theaverage pzvpor-
tion. for th. first threeyears are shoin conjunction
with those for the last threeears./ Statistically speaking,h. increasebetween these two setsof years
can be considered definttsl3significant(a. an indica-
tion of trend not onlywithin the sampl, butamongLll
ri corporation, in theindustry) in the baking, men's
clothing ar.dmachine tool groups,less significant in
ne-.cijy, and not significant infurniture, /
The relative amount of notespayable, on th. other
hand, d.creaasd in the bakingsample, remained approxi-
tel.y the sea. in men's clothingand furniture, and in-
creased in the other twogroups,especially in machine toolThe baking companies'decrease occurred in the
first half of the period (Chart 2);in the stone-clay and
chin. tool sample. the increase tookplaceduring the
depression years.zt even in these two industries, which
showed increases inbothitems,the increas. in the ac-
countspayabl.proportion was more pronounced than that
In the relative amouM. of note, payable. It cannot be
detsemined whether any of thee. changes in thenotes pay-
abis proportion is statistically significant;the safest
ConClusIOn to diaw is thatthis ratio did not undergoany
notrthy chang. in the aa total of small corporations
rprss.nt.d each of theae samples.
Table 13 indicates too that the increase in thepro-
portion of accounts payable bstwe.n the beginning and
Ui end of th. period was characteristic of both thelarg-
er and the smaller companies in the samples,though the
greater rises were reported, on the whole, by the smaller
companies;3/in fact, in the &clothingand furni-
tineampl.sthe upward tendencyin this item was pro-S
Tbisll - SA*LI CO*?ION3 INPIVE IKW$1IL$
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9.9 12.2 9.2 6.?
17.1 23.2 11.1 6.7
17.9 22.5 ICi.)7,
9.) 13.2 10.2 7.1
20.0 30.3 10.4 LC.R
22.2 22.0 8.8 7.6
17.7$.6 12.01.0
22.3 39.4 11.7 15.9
17.7 20.8 9.1
15.2 22.1 11.1 11.0
11.4 12.0 12.2 10.5
19.1 32.5 9.9 11.6
17.6 29.7 13.6 U..6
13.0 14.7 *5 7.5
8.6U.7 9.1 11.0
7.2 10.9 7.8 11.1
10.0 12.6 10.5 10.9
9.3 1.1.5 9.5 12.3
8.0 12.0 6.8 9.7
10.7 23.8 8.9 13.2
10.3 13.9 8.R 8..
11.1 33.8 8.9iLl
12.5 32.0 6.6 16.2 I.e 15.6 11.) 13.6
Neisiis?'bl.s S-? 5.4-iset. Seek C... to.es.t. iô of Cb.p- 1).1. isab uf lb. lie psrl.d.teal.d lbs figure. r.prs.set Lw1.
.1 lbs ,...l.ulLs.s fee' seeS s.r of INet p.rlad;lbs.. ..v..1 f is 1w., r. 'set aisrss. t lbs prspsrti.os for lb. Lidtvl-
1q-'-s. Nes dividl, lb. bities.largsro Li, for s.dlaetrM1 .1., lbsI f lbs avsuet.tai ...et. øt .11 cs penis. Lu lbs1.sr 1936-34.lbs dL.lEj, tins bitesis 'ns. pflt- 'lies pu.tlt.L1. is, tie ssialuet,$..1 iS. -i'-- at lbs mrs. v.11.. si .ties.. (plo. sfttcsro'=..t1ai) ba. .rt*, tsr .11 .s. Is lb. 1. .vw 1926-36.
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duced entirely by theccepasg. of 1esthandjj asset The lessCOflCiasjv,sevement. in therelative awount of notes payableihows noconsistency whenex*mined from the point of vi., ofcoupaiy In baking th,decrease in this pToportio,ja shared bythe large' andth. small- 51coaxj,In the twoindustries thatregistered in- creases the evid. i.Conflicting:th. increase e produced entirely bythe largercoianjIn the stone- clay ul., andentfr,11 by thesmalle ones in thema- cjns tool group.Slight decrease5anog the largersen's clothing and fw'nitur.companies werenullifisa by slight increase. awong thesmaller coapanjein these industries.
Similarly, th,relativeincreaseinaccounts payable was euperI.nced by boththe mereprofitabl, and the less profitabi. of thesecompaniesthat continuedoperatjon throughout the period,And in regard tothe notes payable proportion,both its decrease(in baking) andit. in- crease (in stone-clay andchine tool)seem to have been unrelated to theProfitability of thecompanies, In men's clothing and furniture,where the notespayable propor- tionsfor TMall Companies.were practically thesame at the sod as at the begjnjajgof the period, therewere in- creases ameng the mar.profitable companjeand equiva- lent decrease. amangthe companjewho as net income plus
officers' csnestjon (inpercent of not worth)was un- der thedian level.
Thus far thesetwotypes of ahort-tera debthave been diacss.d aspercentage, of total assets.The story thtall is not changed,however, if theirbehaviorover the 1926-36 periodis viewed inrelationto other items
in financial stpuctue,/ When coaparud to volumeof
business, accounts payablemewed upwardin .v.rygroup ex-
cept men' s clothing, wherethey remained about thesame, and notes payable tendedto decreasein every industry
except stone-clay; this industry,it will be remeshered,
was iidsrgcjng arked sscular decline.When inventory
holdIng, are takenas a bass, accounts payable increased,
while notes payable decreasedin three industries- mark-
edly In baking and furniture,slightly in men's clothing.
Since the mavent of thisratio isdue in part to the
inventory item,which also declined daring these:,ears,
the indicated decreasetends to under,tate ratherthan
overstt. th. dropin notes payable.The magnitude a.d
i'strinl variation of this ratioare interesting;In0
all groups(except baking in .ose of the year. bet,..
1926 .M 1932) .. payable aaounted to 1.e. than iny
tory holdings,and in then's clothing, fw'njtw,an4
eathin. tool groups they s.ldom reached as much a. half
of inventory.
A final indication of the movements in accounts p1.
able and sot.. payable is th. dollar volws of net
in each of thes. two types of debt Over the years 192?-
36.On thisthe figure. ar. as follows, with net. reduc-
tions indicated y minus sign..2IIn all gronpa exc.
stone-clay theree an absolute substitut ion of acc
for note credit over this decade. The significanc. of tt
exception in atone-clay, merethetwo types of credit de-
creased about the asme in dollar volume,is mininie.d b
the fact thatinthis industry the cost of met crisispw.
chased - the customery cause of rCsntile credit- is sz- traordtharflj 1,awting to no nor. than an eighth
of the total valueof proàact.In the men's clothing
group the relatively modest reduction innot..payabl. ic
eosiat aisl.adthg,for in 1936 the companiesin this
,1e tharply increased their notes payable,thsre1' off-
setting almostall of the contraction thathadoccurred
in the preceding year..
On the exact composition ofthe note, payable item
of the.. simple companie. the incometax ret urns give no
inforast Ion, and, even forcorporations in general, sta- tiatica3 data on this pointare usuallysagr.,Notes
payableconsist of bank loan.,trade credits and loans
from officers, directors,stocitholdersandiloyeee, and
it is or4iniriy asaiasd,in financial statement.andy- si., that bank loan.constitute the preponde,sntpropor- tion.Thatthis asmtjon ireasonably valid in regard to the five indu.ti.srepre..nt,.ahere is suggested b7
two sources of Jnfcreation.
Thefirstourc. is Federal TradeComejs.jotabula- tion, covering theprincipal enterprisesineach of the
£CCOIaI* PSvSblt i PsnW.
1160.000
'. cI.th1n 99,000 -
Fiuidtiir. 40,000 -256,000
oiw-c1sj -43,000 -32,000
c*dn. 1q301 37000 - 25,000
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five induatriss studied here and givinga detailed break-
down of current liabilities in193Aand 1939./ These riur.a Indicatethat &t least f or the largercompaiae
these IMuatrise not.. payablewar.composeda1.t
exclusively of bank loans.In every group ii furtii-
tur. either all or99percent of the total not., payable
to trade,banks and individuals wasbank debt in thos.
years.In furniture (represented by.group of 15 coca-
nice) bank loans constituted about half ofnotes payable
in 1938, with the rest divided fairly evenly between the
other two its.ia,and abouttour-fifths in 1939,with
loans to indtvt4ualaccounting forpracticallyallof
the remainder.
The second sourc. of inforrttononthispoiAt is
aspecial tabulation of financial statementspertaining
to a sample of companies that. applied for industrial ad-
vances at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York andshow-
ing notes payable to banks and to trade during 1926-334/
This sampl.includes some companies,wostly of medium
size, in each of the industries studied here, the mieber
ranging from 5 in stone-claythrough10 to 12 in clothing,
furniture and mathui.tool,to 30 in food.In the cloth-
ing, furnitureandmechine tool groups bank loans consti-
tuted about three-fourths of the notes payable to banks
and to trade, and in the food and stone-clay groups they
a!v)unted to abouthalt.
Evidence such as that provided by these two sources
uoes not show conclusively that in our sample industries
bank debt constituted the bulk of the notes payible item,
but it does indicate a presumption in that direction. And
thus theentire body of data presented in this section
patterns into a fairly strong indication that after the
depression of the early 1930's mercantile credit bore a
larger share of these smelt manufacturers' short-term f i-
nanctng than it did beror.. and that over the period as a
whols bank creditwas relied on less: ile mercantile
credit was incr.asing, bank credit was declining (baking)
or r.intng stable (men's clothing and furniture) or in-
creasing less markedly (stone-clay and machine tool). /
*at may have brought about such a shift in the rel-
ative importance of these two types of credit?The ques-
tion, of course, camot be answered definittv.ly,but
certain relevant considerations may be pointed out.Fi,rnaciPf Sio1L Corporaf,o,,
In the firstplace,short-termdebt. isincurred
partly for the purposeof carryinginventory,and j
al1.r ssow%t of fund.is needed for inventory bustn.,.
- us11y prefer tocut doen bank credit first, rather
than trade credit,unless there are strong factors wgin
the opposite course. A decline in invent.oiydoes not
.csssarilyan a declinein short-term financing re-
qirsmWt5, nor does thatresult n.cessarily .san an in..
crease in the relativeimportance of accountspiysble.
at the probabilities ar,that both of these consequences
will follow a decline in thedollar vo1of Inventory
holdings.
Over the 1926-36 period such a decline occurred in
all of this.industries except nen' s clothing. The net
funds receivedfro. the end of 1926 to theendof 1936
through inventOl7 liQuidation were as follows,for four
of the industrLesz/ bsking $76,000; furniture 3299,000;
stone-clay $329,000;chinetool $272,000.In the asn'
clothing sample there was a net acctwailat ion of inventory
asounting to $240,000.
This evidence isat least not contradictedby the
data on inventory in relation to total assets, though
her'. the decline is not very pronounced, andagain men's
clothing ii an exception.The following figures on in-
ventory in percentoftotal assets are averages of annual
proportionsforthe first threeandthe last threeyears
of the period:f
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The reason for this declineappear, to have been not
a reduction in the physical voluiso of inventorybut a gen-
eral 1.11 in rawterial and finished goods prices dur-
ingthep.riod covered bythe data.Forexample, in1936
thesholesal.price of KansasCity winterstraights sheat
flour was 75 percent of itsaveragein 1926;the shole-
saleprice ofbrick and tile wasre than 10 percent low-
er in 1936 than In 1926;a composite wholesal, price of
















Msa's clothing 32.1 37.3
Fuanitur. 29.1 27.1
15.6 15.2
ch1a. tool 22.S 11.5ch"gif Credst Needs 73
The assumption that it was a price fall rather tluia
adsCliflein voluthat prodocsdthe dacr.au in dollar
volume of inventory is supported by data on iiw.ntory in
relation to sal... On this bash, inventory holdingsdo
ot appear to have moveddecisively eitherumsrd or down-
ward.It I. truethat theydecreasedslight 13' in baking
and machine tool,bUt. they increasedfairly sharply in
gtons-C1*7,and remained stable in the other two indus-
tries.Thisy beobserved from the following figures,
*hich represent, again,average. of annualproportions
(inventory to sales) for the firstthree and the last
three years of the period; (
Thus it appears that one of the causes for the rel-
atively greaterimportanceof mercantiln creditin the
financing of these meshmanufacturersver the 1926-36
period wes a decline in th.dollar volume of inventory
holdings.And there are indications that this, in turn,
was due to the declinein pricesthat cecurred during
those years.22/
Other factors may have worked more directlyto in-
crease the relative importanceof mercantile credit, by
increasing its supply. Competition,perimpssharpened by
Uis depression, among the raw material aridequipment sup-
pliers may have led them to s.ek morebusiness from these
ll manufacturer. by of feting moretrade credit.There
is a strong premtiun that at least thelarge suppliers
were able to capitalize oncheapmoney rates, and thereby
found themselves in a position to grant morecredit to
th.tr customers.If the capital market did servethus as
a source offunds for the raw materialsuppliers,the
paradox results that sizable resourcesnot. directly avail-
able toflbusinesses were usednevertheless to f i-
nance each enterprisesindirectly. And the suppliers may,
of course, have obtained additionalfunds for the financ-
ing of smallnufacturers from sourcesotner than the
capital market,for instancefrom a reduction of their







ch.ns tool 17.574 Fi*ancint S",all Co.poragj01,
But though ther -y havebeen an increase in credit
granted, thin.is no .vidence thatcredit was offered o
mere attractive tsrme./In fact,persons familiar
with credit conditionsin these industriesreport that
trad. credits in the middle 1930's wereextended either
on the ums or on less liberal termsthan they wire in
Ui. 1920'.. In general, the ttghtening ofthis. terni
cams with the advent of the FflA. There mayhave been
co.titive liberalization of trade credits in the early
1930'.,or evenin th. late 1920's;but for thelast
three year. of 1926-36 trade credits were offered on 1e
liberal terns than at any other time during the period,
fact that would hardl.y be expected to encourage an expan
sion of mercantile credit on the part or these smill man-
ulacturers.Therefore any expansion that occurred must
have been in spite of, rather than because of, the terms
of purchase.
The tightening of credit terms occurred pai-icularly
it:the men's clothing and furniture industries. In the
late 1920's the selling terms of a prominent wool sn man-
ufactiirer supplying themen'sclothing trade were 10/ic,
8/60 or ?/4,with season's dating as of December 1 or
June 1 for the 7/4 t.rma.f These were, obviousl,, very
liberal terms, enabling the men' s clothing manufacturerto
getwell along, U not through,his productiverOcess
before he was calied upon ror repajment. of his mercantile
credits.But sincs the NRA days terms of sale for wool-
en, and worateds have been fairlyuniformat 1/10, n/60,
the former being elected primarily by the largebuyers,
the latter by the small manufacturers,such as those that
constitute the sales studied here;moreover, the prdc-
tics of season's dating is no longercurrent. 8.rore the
depression of the 1930'. suit lirdngswere sold ig the
basis ornet 60 days from the end of themonthfor the
small buyers, and on 4 month,.o.m. for theldrgbuyers. During the middle 1930's theywere sold on 60 e.o.m. for
all buyers, though todaya few are again obtaining terms
of 4 e.o.m.
ianufacturers of uphoisterecafurniture buytheir
piece goods, such as mohairand other fabrics,onterms
of 2/10, n/b. These termswere established ir. 1933, and
before that year had been 6/10plus 60 extra,which is
quivaait. to tenes of 6/70,or 7/10 because of the priv-
ilege of anticipat di.cowitto gain an annual ratengiJeCredit Needs
of 6 percent interest.In dollar volume the bulk of the
raw material and supplies purchas.s by upholsteredfurni-
ture manufacturers is for piece goods, with purchasesor
frameS relatively insignificant.Some manufacturers make
their own frames; others buy them, usually for cash.In
fact,furniture manufacturers may even have to advance
money to theframe manufacturers because the latter are
frequentlySmall backwoods shops with little,if any,
working capital.
Flour purchases, particularly by the small bakeries,
are largely on a cash basis.Sonetimes terms of n/30 are
allowed, but on the other hand bakers with poor financial
ratings frequently have to bay their flouron a C.O.D.
basis.There is no evidencethat these termschanged
markedly over the 1926-36 period,but there are Indica-
tions that the flour millers have beentending to supply
the bakers directly rather thanthrough jobbers or whole-
sale grocers.The latter, it appears, found thecredit
risktoo large for the profit niargininvolved inthe
transactic,fl.fl,1
Siai]crly, the machine toolmanufacturers' purchases
of raw steel, such as foundrybillets and pig, ar. on the
same terms now as inthe 1920's:/io, n/30.Parts for
nachine t0015, such as gearsand cutting tools, are and
have been bought on termsof 1/10, n/30, or, if the sup-
plier happens tobe a manufacturer of partsfor the auto-
nobile industry,on the slightly moreliberal terms of
1/10 and 25./ For manufacturersof stone-Clay products
raw material, purchases,as was mentioned inthe preceding
chapter, arere1tively unimportant, andtherefore in re-
gard to this industry thequestion of trade termsof pur-
chase is largely irrelevant.
ILoreover, among the fivein-
dust.ries that are studiedhare, this group gavethe least
indication of a shiftingfrom flotes payableto &ccounts
payable.
A final reason forthe relative increasein inercan-
tUecredit mayhave been thegeneral tightening ofbank
credit during the depressiCfl.The fact, revealed byChart
2 above, that thesecompanies experiencedtheir relative
increase in accountspayable mainly in thesecond half of
the 1926-36 period lendssupport to thishypothesis, but
the question is one onwhich we can do no morethan spec-
ulate, in the presentinstance.Fiiinc;ng Sra1I CorporatioN5
Creditor-Debtor Relationships
Small manufacturers are creditor. as well a. d.bt
of the banks,,and over the period 1926-36 the relation.
ship between their credit balance and their debit ba1ic.
became increasingly favorabli to them.This we. true of
all the industris. studied hereexceptstons-clay, as is
indicated by the following averages, for the first three
and last three years of the period, of annual figures or
cash in percent of notea payable:2/
1926-28 193-36
701 9$
sns elothiml 71 Si
?umiur 5? 97
81 63
M&ehine tool 5? 101
In this relationship the change is more marked than
in those discussed above,and it shows clearly that in
theaggregate these sample companiescase tohaveprac-
tically as much cash on hand and in the banks as they had
obligation,due on not.. (most of which were presumably
to the banks).The notsa payableitem,moreover, was thu
activ, agent in this shift; cash holdings remained fair1
stable.BeCause these figures refer to each sampleas a
wiole, because not .11 the notes payable aredueto banks,
and because soma companie.in thesesamplesreported no
notespayable, the proportionsgivenhers are not neces-
sarily illustrative of tP. creditor-debtor relationship
existingbetweenthe ordinarymaall businessand its
bank.They do, however, indicate that afterthe dspre.-
sion the creditor position of theseConCerns taken a. a
group was about tha s as their debtor po.iticn, as far
as the banks were onc.rned, whereasbeforethe d.pre.-
sion this group of companies hadbeennet debtors of the
banks. Practically all of thischange in creditor-debtor
position canbeattributed to a decreas, in theuse of
back credit.
Inade accounts, however, therelaticnstijp between
current assb' aid current debtwas quite different.The
tiede Credits d by these smallmanufacturer. were, ex-
cept in the baking sample,considerably less than their
outstanding receivables,but the margin tendedto shrink
during the period studied.This is evident from the fol-
lowing tabulation,which shows, for theearlier and thechaNtiNe Credit Needs 77
later yea's of the period, averages of annual figures on
receivables in percent of accounts payable./ Evenwith
the narrowing margin between th. outstandingcredit exten-
,jcns of these coepeniss and the outstanding creditgrant-
ed thna by their suppliers,their receivablesstill ex-
ceeded their accounts payable by 50 to 120 percent atthe
end of th. period, except in baking. In that.industrythe
.quality between outstanding mercantil,credit granted
and received is explained by the relative rarityof cred-
it sales;isost bakers,especially thesnailconcerrs,
seU their product on a cash basis.
What nay be called the creditor reliefobtained by
these companies - the narrowingof the differentialbe-
tween outstanding customer crsdttgranted and mercantile
credit received - is strikingly indicatedby the dollar
figures. The following tabulation, ich refers againto
the period before and theperiod after the depression,
shows for each industry the averageof annual differences
between year-SM outetaridingsin receivables and accounts
payebiS;/ the figures forbaking, marked with a minus
sign,represent an excess of accountspayable over re-
In any analysis of thereceivables itemin the t i-
nancial stateetente of thesecompanies, an Important qual-
ification is necessitatedby the practice of receivables
factoring. It is known that in someof the industries,
particularly men's clothing,receivables are frequently
sold to financing agencies.Factoring of this sortwculd
lead to an understat.emefltof receivables, sincefactored
receivables and th.contra_liability (if any) arenot gen-
erally shown on th. balancesheet ./ There is noway of




Nsa's clothing 199 150
Fur,1*r. 245 217
266 176




'a clothing 769,000 336,000
1,397,000 815,000
Stos.-c1' 945.000 362,000
$scht,is tosl 642,000 461.000Finawci"g S,riatl Corporatso5
niss in the sieplea./ Whatever it. extent, howyp,
it would only increase, notcontradict, the observed dir.
ferenoe between reeaivables and accounts payable; thue,
while it might modify the decrease in that margin betve.,
the beginning and the end of the period,it i.
likely that it would account for the entire decrease.
The terms on which these coanues sold th.tr prod-
ucts, while they probably did not caus. th. relative dc.
cliii. in outstanding receivables,' at least do not ap-
pear to hay, interfered with it. In moat of these five
industries selling terms at th. end of the period studied
here were no more liberal than in the middle 1920'.; when
a change occurred it was in the direction of less liberal
selling terms.
The terms on which the manufacturers of man's cloth-
ing sold their product in the middle and l.t. 1920'. were
in the neighborhood of 9/10, 7/70.Since the depression
of the early 1930'. they have rarely been more than 2/10,
net 60 or 70, and today they are frequently straight net
60 or 70, with no discount.Mtifactur.r. of upholstered
furniture customarily sell their product on terms of21%,
n/60, or sometimes straight 2/30.When the time cansnaed
in transportation is an important factor(as in sales of
an eastern ranifacturer to a western buyer) terms of 2/%,
n/90 are frequently offered.Person, familiar with this
industry declare that thes. terms havenot changed mate-
rially since th. 1920'..The baking industry sells its
product largely on a cash basis.
For machine tco].s the terms cfsale are relatively
unusortant and not particularlyuaiform.For complete
.achine tools, such as lathes andborer., regularterms 1 are and have been n/30.A few companiesare reported to
have offered 1 percent forpayment 10 days after date of
invoice, but. this practicehas been quite generally aban-
doned since the depressionof theearly1930'..Terms of
sale for macbin, toolaccessories vary widely, and depend t
on th. prevailing terms in theindustry to which theyare c sold.Cutting tool. haveCustomarilysold on terms of





ing alt important part in the negotatione. Most of the
instal*stt PPS1'arising from these transactions is of
12- to A-month maturity, with a 25 percent doen payment,
though a fof the contracts run for 36 months.*en
the instalment purchase of a machine too]. I. financed by
a sales finance company the transaction appears as a cash
a].0on the books of the machine tool manufacturer. There-
for. the increase of instil wt purchase. ofachine
tools has not affected the outstanding receivables and
accOUfltpayable of this industry.
Selling termsin the brick and tile industry are
r.lativ.1.y short Con brick frequently sells at a dis-
count of 50 cents per thousand brick, and face brick at a
$1 discount, for payment In 30 days. On til. the discount
ranges from 2/30 to 5/30,though sometimes the discount
date is the 25th of the month for invoices dated from the
1st to the 15th, and the 10th of the following month for
invoices datedfroni the 16th to the 31st.These terms
vary from company to company as well as from areatoarea,
and it i. difficult to ascertain whether there has been a
marked change from the middle 1920', to the mIddle 1930' s.
It has been declared that. selling terms before the depres-
sion were frequently 2 percent discountfor cash in 30
days for a]]. the various brick and tile producl.s. If this
is true the discount today is more attractivebanit was
in the 1920's, but the discount period i no longer.
During the course of thestrong business fluctua-
tions of 192b-36 th. small companies in the samplesbe-
haved in moch the same way as their larger counterparts,
except. that their reaction was in some respectssharper.
The large companies, with their strong liquidityposi-
tion, were abl. to resist the forces of deflation more
effective]y than themall enterprises,as is indicated
by the financial structure and discntinuaflCerate of the
compani.s under review. at despite differences in mag-
nitude,the cyclical changes in thefinancial structure
of large and small concerns wars of asimilar pattern.
Economists have long r.cognissdthat thatpart of
the economy which caters tothe demands of consumersis
more stabl, cyclically than thatwhich serves the pro-8o r,nahu.I.r
duc.rs, a difference .stnlj to the factthatodi,
goods are usually sere durable than consur goods. 7j
gen.rsliestton is substantiated medico. of the vo]t
of busineu dun. 1' our .a1e. of s&U coant. Over
the period 1926-36 (presented bslow in Chart 4). ari
the post-1929 depression the index of ..l.. vo1 f.i
enre diarpl.yin the indu.triss produ3induieble gooda
thanirkthOse nuf$oturii*i10I1WabLSgooda,/
in the prosperous years it roe. to greater hstgI*.. These
indices are based on eels, at current pita..,and stnc
ths price, of conaneer goods fluctuated enreiarp1y this
tho.. of produc.r good., the curvesto the chart tend to
understate the difference between the ten group..
Smiler variat tonsbetween producerand conousr
good. industries,andbetween durable and non-durable
good. industries, are reflected in th. profit ratiospro..
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tries in the early 1930' $were solug. that they stand
et ROhre PrOsiflefltly than the profit.made in the
ate 1920's and middle 1930'..It was in the durable
groups, however, that losses were moat severe.In
,tons-al$7, to taks the rsss Cass,notloss.. *vsr&g.d
third of sal.. in 1932, whereas in baking,to take the
other sztrsss, thnever amouat.d to more than 3 percent.
. dursbl goods industries, on the other hand, xp.ri-
.iced higher profit ratesinthe prosperous years.
Another economic theorem which issubstantiated by
the cyclical behavio" ofthese samples is the observa-
tion that agrowing industry tendsto reactearlier than
others during expansion andto lag during contraction,
whereas a declining industry tends tobehave in the oppo-
gte manner.Of the five groups studiedhere,stone-clay
is a declining industry,and machine toolan expanding
on.; the others ar. fairly stable.This is evident from
Chart 3,which shows the physical vol'.ams of output ofall
the establishmsritsin four of thee. industries,jf and
in all.nufacturing industries throughout the country,
for periods a. far beck a. the dateareavailable.The
s.cular dsclinein the stone-clay industry over th. pe-
riod1899-1937 standsin sharp contrastto thesecular
Increase over the sass periodintotal manufacturing.
For the other industriesrepresentedin Chart 3 the data
cover a macb shorter period,and therefore it is more
difficult to detect a secular mo'vnt. Baking and man' s
clothing appear to have been relatively stable, for their
trends closely foUow that of total.nufacturing; ocr-
tainl.y there is no evidence of a long-tim. decline. Prob-
ably the aeme is true of furniturs manufacture,though
here the picture 1. influenced by th. lag in the closely-
correlated construction industry.As for the Output Of
Uie machine tool industry,eanotion ofits long-run
trends ii afforded by data on value added by the manu-
facturing process.Pros 1099 to 1937 the value added by
mafacture in the fomdry and machine shop productsin-
dustry (which includes machine tools) rose 548 percent,
Mincrease 13 percentgreater than the corresponding
na. for all nanufacturing industriescombined.f
H.re too - in regard to secular growthand decline
sales data -y be taken as indicatorsof cyclical dif-
ferences ssong the sample industries.In the declining
stone-clay industry,as can be seenfrom Chart 4, our8a Fisa.ici.sg Small Corporat0
FOUR MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES AND TO..
TAt MANUFACTURING:Indices ofPhysical
Output,1899-1937 I 929= 100)
aDataforfurniture from National Re-
search Project, Prodvctjo,,. Emloyme,ut
aiud Prodvctivity byHarry Magdoff,
Irving H. Siegeland Milton B. Davis
IPhiladeiphia9391 Pt.2, p.80.Data
for other three industries,and for
total manufacturing,fromNationap Bu-
reau ofEconomicResearch, The Oitsit
of Nsivf.ctr,u Imdaistries.1899-1937.
by Solomon Fabricant(New York 19401
pp.384, 423, 522, 525, 602.cont1"1 Credit Needs
FIVE MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES: Indices
of Sales for Sample Corporaticrs, and




asa,esdataare annual, and arebased
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Tables I-A to I-Ein Appendix F.Va!-
ue_of_PrOduCtS data arebiennial,and
for baking, men'sclothing and stone-
clay are based onNational tureau of
EconOffliC Research,TheOutPut of Nanu-
lecturing IndustrieS.sRqQ-'937.by
Solomon Fabricant(New York 1940) pp.
384, 423-24,522-26;vaIue_Of_Pr0t5









sei1e of successful coanis. rsach.d their sties
in 192B, a year bfore the cyclical turningensiaj
ness,shereas in theother four industrie. the sasp
cospsni.ssalsa peaks confozsd with th. reference.
ole; and the atone-cia, .aspledidnet reach its,
qe,t trogh mtil 1933,a yesr l.t.r than thethsrs.
lb. converse lagin ocet.rsctinn and1..d in sx3ansjo
that is to be.sct.d intheexpendingeachin. tool j.
dustr7 carmot be detected tics Ui... a'1 data,but.
Chart 4do.. provid. furth.r evidooc. that this
ens eeri.nctn a .cular ris,in voleas of businea
forits sale. voleas in 1936 ens Considerablyhigher thafl
it had beanin 1926.The iii..of the baking and',
clothing group. enrs about- theseat theas at tt.
bsgioning of th.period,Will, thos, offurniture wore so.swhat lower and thoes of stone-clayears h lower. This divergencyindicate, again Ui. ssculardecline in
atone-clay, and sugg.ets that th. furnitureindestryens sufferingIron th. effect,ofthe lag in housing.
The volume of busine.s done theflenraifactu r studied hersss to hay. to1lo each thesis, Course during1926-36 as that of alleatablisnt. in
thess particular Un.. ofbusinm. Thi. is evidentfros
a coqisrison of th, sale.indsz ofthe .aqile cani.a
with tb. Ya1us-Of.pt.index of all eqianiss,also presented jChart4./ iyincing ens thecp after 1929 ear.pronos4 for the saqilec-,'anle than for all ooqiasije,in the industry.AM during the sshae- quintrecovery period the asqilscsnj(cspt in Lbs baking group)appear tohays enpandsd theirsale, ions Wiat ears sharplythan did allsstabil.sL. in the re- spective field..In other word., thei, Coaed of ooqinj.. that oOr*.jnu.din existence from1926 through 1936, slightlyIncreased theirproportjos,, share ofthe budut.., thatenshandled by all theentir,e, in thes tnduatij...
The.. obuivations, bousvsr,ar, for the ea,npart only Confirmationof widelyr5cognj eco',.j facts, A mere specificquestion on Witch thepresent. data can throw aces lightii how the fininct*iaIractu. of these enail corporation,responded to th.strong flectnetjoe, that charseterisodthe period ndsrreview.Now did the ooqiajijutiUse thstrprofit, in goodyears,and haw diii they financetheir opsrstjorsinçrnjta jusra?
Fii,o,cing Sw,aIi Cor*or.gjoDuring prosperity the companies in these samples,On
the '4iole, used their net income, mipplemented by borrow-
mgi, for landandplant expansion,cash dividend di.-
btu'semants and Uisaccumulation ofcurrent assets.The
foregoing figures for the 118 machine too] companies may
be regarded as roughly illustrative;the figure. are in
thousands of dollars,and pertain to the sum of opera-
tions for the three years 1927-29.4/The reduction of
notes payable does not conform to th. general pattern of
tinancial adjustments d'ring a prosperity period, but it
offersfurther ev.4ence of the declining importance of
bank as compared with mercantile credit. It. should be
msntionsd, homever, that this bank debt reduction by the
machin, tool samplemas concentratedin 1929,and was
offset to some extent by medeet increases in bank borrow-
iziga in the eari,y 19Y)'s.
Por unprofitable yara the picture is in general the
reverse of that shown above.In such periods these small
corporationsfinanced their operations by liquidating
their assets, both fixed and current Her. the figure.
for the 70 companies in the stone-clay grouppresented
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m.r inwhich .1] five of thesamplesfinanced their
dspresiOfl losses anddividend disburseasrits; th. data,
again In thous3fld3of dollars, refer to the .of oper-
ations for the three years1930-32.9/Land and plant
outlays wer,less than half thed.preci.tton accruals,
implying that conaidirablSamounts of fixed property were
used up without, beingreplaced./ Cash dividends were
even large? than thenet operating losses that had tobe
finnc.d, but it should bee.swhered that these figures
are aggregates for a groupof 70 companies,not all of
which paid dividends.
These two sets of figaree reveal thatduring fluctu-
ations in business the brunt - of thenecessary financial
adjustments i. borne by the current items.In time. of
cyclical expansion inventory is accuilst.d arid receiv-
ables are increased, and the fundsneeded for these p*ar-.
pose. are obtained from short-termcredits as well a. from
profits.During cyclical contraction a sharp liquidatiorL
of inventory and of receivable, is necessary,inorder to
obtain funds for psying off short-term debts arid for fi-
nancirig opersting Losses,andsometimesfor disbursing
dividends. Thus the credit structure of the companies in
our samples is considerably more flexibl. than their cap-
italstructure.For .mple, during 1927-29 .i.t 1933-36,
both period, ofcyclicalexpansion, th.mercantilecred-
its of these mellnufacturers increased in dollar vol-
sea (from the beginning to the end of the period), and in
some instances their bank borrowings also expended. These
credits helped to provide th funds needed for the accu-
enlat ton of inventory and thefinancing ofcredit sales.
During the years of cyclical decline,1930-32, when funds
were needed for a reduction in theamount ofcurrent ('ebt,
there wes liq.aidation of current assets.In these years,
however, the funds obtained through current asset liq-
uidation (through cash and government bonds as well a.
through liquidation of inventory and receivables) greatly
exceeded the fund, requiredfor current debt reduction,
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a Rasedon TNECMonograph 15 lpreviously
cited) Tables I-A to I-EinAppendix F.
The vertical lines indicatecycliCal turn-
ing points in general business (calendar-
year dates) as determined byW.C.Mitchell
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tions of these threey.I?5,1930-32,combined. 2/ m.
excess provided acushion to finance other operating ad-
Juatnts and in some casesto pay unearned dividends.
The concomitantreduct ion in current assets and cur-
rent dsbt. resulted in afairlystable ratioofcurrent
assets to currentliabilities, as can hi s..n from Chart
5.The cyclical movementobservablehers in the
ratio is ab lessirksd than thatfouni in the ratio
of profits to sales(Table 14) or even in such ratios as
current assets or currentliabilities to total assets.
Chart 5 revealsthat in the three conswaergoods jnd-
tries,particularlyjnn'a clothing and furniture,
there was soms evidenceof a currdnt ratio movement con-
trary to the course ofgeneral business, that is, of an
upward movenent in depssiOfland a downward one in pros-
perity. In the tproducer goods industriesthere is
indication of a directly cyclicalmovement, but here the
downward tendency in the ratioover the entire period
tends to obscure its cyclical variation.
The foregoing analysis indicates that the financing
requirensnts of sllnufactur.ra,as typified by the
presentsamplesof companies in five different industries
runlargely intires of short-term credits and equity cap-
ital.Ibreover, the proportion of short-term credits ob-
tamed from mercantile sourcis appears to have increased
over the1926-36 period,inrelation to the proportion
obtained through banking channels. it the terms of pur-
chase in these industries were not liberalized over this
period, and th greater part. of the relative increase in
..rcantile credits occurred during and after the d.pr.s-
sian of the early 1930's.Therefore the permanency of
this observed shift in the relative importanceof bank
'and trsds credity be open to question.The1936 In-
crease in th.dollar amount of bank debt shown by these
,ll manufacturers suggeststhat the years of cyclical
expansion subsequent to1936 .yhave obliterated most of
the tendency toward a relatively greater reliance on mer-
cantile credit.M havenoproof, however, that this re-
version has taken place, and for the machine tool sample
then, is positive evidencethat the increasedshare of
accounts payabl.in the short-tore fins icingof these
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co.panies not only wasintained through 1939,but was s,gntidit ill further.
It is difficult to ascertain from th. present analy-
sts shat type. of financing, not already available, are
seededsh coant.s as these.There arestrong
grounds - instability of earnings, high rate of discontin-
anc. and the like - for believing that 1ong-tercredits
imuld not serve their purposes.Their needs run, rather,
In i.r.s of equity capital and short-term credits.But
equity capitalfrom outside sources is probably one of
the last things ,wafl entrepreneurs want; theirsenseof
individuality and free private enterprise is strong, and
they react quickly against any schem. that night jeopard-
ise their control over their property. It appears, there-
fore, that.t these small manufacturers need is equity
capital from inside sources, and short-term credits from
banks, other financing agencies and trade suppliers.
Equity capital from inside sources mist, in most in-
stances, coma from retenticn of earnings in the business
during profitable years,and from a minimizingof fund
withdrawals during unprofitable years.These effects
could be achi.ve4 by maintaining a close watch on owner-
ship withdrawals,both officer.' comper..ationand cash
dividends. Such wariness de!larllis, noweer, alonger range
point of view than thatexhibited by mafly small manufac-
turer.. Thu. it appears that unless something canbe done
to broaden entrepreneurial perspective thefinancing of
sislibusinesses will continue tobe a pressing problem,
particularly during andafterp.ricda of extended cycli-
cal contraction,and thatthe mast practicable avenue
for relief isshort-tezi&, andpossibly alsomedium-tern,
credits. 2il